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Is section 347 of the Criminal Code 1872 compatible with the Convention Rights referred to in 
the Human Rights Act 2001? 
 
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and 
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”.1  Human rights are the 
basic rights and freedoms that an individual should be able to expect regardless of their nationality or 
citizenship in a free and fair society.   
 
The Human Rights Act 2001 (“the Act”) came fully into force on 1 November 2006 in the Isle of Man 
with the purpose of incorporating the fundamental rights and freedoms set out in the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) into Manx domestic law 
and to make it unlawful for a public authority on the Isle of Man to act in such a way as to clash with or 
violate those rights.  The Manx courts are also required to read and give effect to all legislation in a 
way which is compatible with the main articles of the Convention and where it cannot do so, make a 
statement of incompatibility.  The rights in the Act are designed to protect any individual against 
abuses by the state.    
 
There are 16 basic rights in the Act.  When considering the question this essay will refer substantially 
to whether Section 347(“the Section”) is compatible with arguably the four most important rights in a 
free and fair society embodied in the Convention, namely Article 6, the right to a fair trial, Article 7, no 
punishment without law, Article 9, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and Article 
10, the freedom of expression (“the Rights”).  In doing this, the essay will take a threefold approach.  It 
will consider firstly if the Section restricts the human right in question, secondly, if the restriction is in 
pursuance of a legitimate aim and thirdly, if it is in pursuance of a legitimate aim, consideration of 
proportionality, i.e. if it is more than the minimum necessary restriction needed in order to achieve the 
legitimate aim.  The essay will then comment on the Section generally. 
 
In order to do this, it is necessary to understand what the Section was and is trying to achieve.  The 
Section is a ‘sweep up’ section to the group of offences against the public health and the public peace 
or economy of the Criminal Code 1872 (“the Code”).  It provides: 
‘Whosoever shall do any act or thing (not hereinbefore or in any other unrepealed Act of Tynwald or 
bye-law made by any authority of any Act of Tynwald, specified or referred to, or otherwise provided 
for by law)in contempt of God or religion, or in contempt of the Queen’s Government, or against public 
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justice or against public trade, or against the public health, or to the disturbance of the public peace, 
or injurious to public morals, or outraging decency, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.’  
On reading, due to its wide drafting, it is difficult to establish what the Section aims to achieve.  The 
Section seems to try to provide protection to the general public by making an offence any action not 
already provided for in legislation which may jeopardise or disrupt peace, security or the general order 
of day to day society.   
 
Article 6 of the Convention provides: 
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgement shall be pronounced publicly by the 
press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public 
order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the 
protection of the private life of the parties so require, or the extent strictly necessary in the 
opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of 
justice.  
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law.  
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:  
o (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him;  
o (b) to have adequate time and the facilities for the preparation of his defence;  
o (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if 
he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the 
interests of justice so require;  
o (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance 
and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses 
against him;  
o (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the 
language used in court.  
In Perez v France2 it was held that 'the right to a fair trial holds so prominent a place in a democratic 
society that there can be no justification for interpreting Article 6(1) of the Convention restrictively'. 
Section 348 of the Code provides that: 
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‘Whosoever shall be convicted of any of the misdemeanours hereinbefore in the last ten sections 
specified shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years and to a fine.’   
There is no committal and no jury given the section is triable summarily which restricts the right to a 
fair and public hearing under Article 6.  However, Article 6(1) allows for this right to be restricted in the 
‘interest of morals, public order or national security...where the interests of juveniles or the protection 
of the private life of the parties so require, or...in the opinion of the court in special circumstances 
where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice’.  Depending on the nature and severity of the 
‘act or thing’ done by an individual, this could be in pursuance of a legitimate aim.   
 
The fact that a policy restricts a person’s human rights does not necessarily mean that it is not 
compatible with the Convention.  As with all countries, the Isle of Man has a responsibility to protect 
the safety of its people.  If a restriction on a qualified right has a legitimate aim, such as public safety, 
and the restriction is only as much as is necessary to achieve that aim then it could be compatible 
with the Convention.  In considering if the aim is proportionate, The European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECHR”) gives countries a margin of appreciation.  The scope of the concept of margin of 
appreciation was outlined in Handyside v. United Kingdom3 which recognised that national authorities 
are in principle better placed to evaluate local needs and conditions than an international court.   The 
Convention does not need to be applied universally in all states but can vary in application according 
to local needs and can restrict the rights of individuals accordingly in order to balance competing 
interests and proportionality4.  The Isle of Man, being a small island with an approximate population of 
only 80,000 has substantially different local needs and conditions to that of a larger country which is 
not a crown dependency or equivalent.    
Again, depending on the nature and severity of the ‘act or thing’ done by an individual if it is no more 
than the minimum necessary restriction needed in order to achieve the legitimate aim then it is not 
incompatible with the Convention.  The application of Article 6(1) depends on the facts of each case 
as demonstrated in R (on the application of Dudson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department5 
which held there was no absolute right to a public hearing at every stage in the proceedings at which 
the claimant or his representatives were heard orally.  The application of Article 6(1) to the 
proceedings in this case (other than at first instance) depended on the special features of the 
proceedings in question.  It was held that consideration had to be taken of the entirely of the 
proceedings, the role of the person conducting the proceedings that were in question, the nature of 
the system within which they were being conducted and the scope of the powers being exercised.  It 
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also held that Article 6 does not state that there has to be an oral hearing at every stage of 
proceedings for a hearing to be public and fair.  In this case the detainee was convicted of murder in 
1993.  The Chief Justice’s task was to assess where, given the going rate for the setting of tariffs for 
adult murderers, the claimant's case should be placed on the scale given his age at the time of the 
murder and his progress since he was taken into custody.  The Chief Justice had to have regard to 
the public interest as well as the interests of the detainee, and he had to have regard to the 
requirement that the exercise had to be carried out within a reasonable time as Article 6(1) requires.  
If he had to conduct oral hearings in every case it would prolong his task and therefore cause delay.  
It followed that taking into account the special features of the proceedings the absence of an oral 
hearing did not violate Article 6(1). 
Section 348 of the Code does restrict the human right in question.   The restriction is in this situation 
not in pursuance of one of the legitimate aims as no matter what the nature and severity of the ‘act or 
thing’ done is, section 348 automatically disallows committal and a jury.  No consideration is needed 
to be given to proportionality here as there is no pursuance of a legitimate aim.   
 
Article 7 of the Convention provides: 
1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which 
did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was 
committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the 
time the criminal offence was committed.  
2. This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission 
which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations.  
In the case of Kafkaris v. Cyprus6, it was stated that: 
“The guarantee enshrined in Article 7, which is an essential element of the rule of law, occupies a 
prominent place in the Convention system of protection … It should be construed and applied, as 
follows from its object and purpose, in such a way as to provide effective safeguards against arbitrary 
prosecution, conviction and punishment...”. 
Litigation under this article generally covers the issue of legal certainty rather than overtly 
retrospective legislation.  The Section, as a ‘sweep up’ provision, does not give an individual a fair 
warning of the offence being committed due to its broad wording and wide application.  There is no 
certainty to give an accused an indication of what they are doing wrong.  On reading, it may be 
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difficult for any individual charged with an offence under this Section to prove the act or thing they had 
done was not covered.   
In the Kafkaris case above, it was stated “only the law can define a crime and prescribe a penalty”.  
The European Court considers the term ‘law’ to mean statute and case-law and seems to interpret the 
term ‘law’ broadly.  However, the law must meet requirements of accessibility and foreseeability.   In 
Kafkaris, the Court stated that the definition of the offence (and the penalty) must be accessible and 
foreseeable.  The accessibility and foreseeability requirements regularly feature in case law relating to 
many articles under the Convention as well as Article 7.  The law must be sufficiently clear for 
individuals to understand and conduct themselves in accordance with its provisions making it 
accessible, and where there are changes to the law, the changes must be predictable and therefore 
foreseeable. 
Kafkaris also held that it “must have regard to the domestic law as a whole and the way it was applied 
at the material time”.  Article 7 aims to provide legal certainty by requiring governance in accordance 
with prior rules. The certainty this offers individuals is compromised if courts can deprive rules of their 
legal character after the offence. 
In Erdogdu and Ince v Turkey7 the applicants were prosecuted under section 8 of the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 1991.  The applicants claimed a breach of their rights under Articles 7(1), 9 and 10 of 
the Convention.  Under Article 7(1), they claimed that the national legislation was “so vague that it had 
not enabled them to distinguish between permissible and prohibited behaviour”.  Despite this 
argument, they made no claim that their Article 10 rights were not ‘prescribed by law’, even though 
the same measure alleged offended both articles.  The European Court of Human Rights noted that 
as it had found the interference prescribed by law for the purposes of Article 10, it would find no 
violation under Article 7(1) either.  The reason for this is because the court found that even though 
section 8 had prima facie breached their human rights, it was in pursuance of a legitimate aim, that 
being the prevention of terrorism and therefore the protection of society.   
In Cantoni8, the Court declared that there are always “grey areas at the fringes of the definition of the 
law” and Article 7(1) simply requires that the law is “sufficiently clear in the large majority of cases… 
and the applicants must have known on the basis of their behaviour that they ran a real risk of 
prosecution ”. 
The purpose of the Section is well intentioned, protecting public safety and morals, but this does 
inevitably restrict the human right in question even though it is in pursuance of the legitimate aims.  
When considering proportionality here, without the benefit of accessibility, individuals may find it 
                                                          
7 Erdogdu v Turkey (app nos 25067/94 and 25068/94) (8 July 1999, unreported), ECt HR 
8 V. France (1) [1996] ECHR 17862/91 
  
6 
difficult to ascertain where the boundaries of legal and illegal behaviour lie.  However, accessibility 
and foreseeability do not prevent laws from being broadly drafted where this is necessary for the law 
to fulfil its role.  For example, laws relating to terrorism may be vague, but still compliant with Article 7.  
When looking at if the Section is proportionate, it would depend on the nature and severity of the ‘act 
or thing’ done by an individual.   
 
Article 9 of the Convention provides: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice 
and observance.  
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, 
for the protection of public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others.  
Leyla Şahin v. Turkey9 challenged a Turkish law which banned wearing the Islamic headscarf at 
educational and state institutions. The verdict upheld the Turkish law.  In the case the ECHR 
endorsed the national authorities’ view of the headscarf as ‘antagonistic to both secularism and 
gender equality’.  At the material time the applicant was a university student.  In 1998 the Vice-
Chancellor of the university issued a circular directing that students with beards and students wearing 
the Islamic headscarf would be refused admission to lectures, courses and tutorials.  The applicant 
was denied access to enrollment on a course, admittance to lectures and a written examination. The 
faculty also issued her with a warning for contravening the university’s rules on dress and suspended 
her from the university for taking part in an unauthorised assembly that had gathered to protest 
against them.  The applicant claimed a violation of Article 14 and Article 9, stating that the prohibition 
on wearing the headscarf forced students to choose between education and religion and 
discriminated between believers and non-believers.  As it is stated in the case of Kokkinakis v Greece 
10 "freedom to manifest one's religion or belief recognizes that in democratic societies, in which 
several religions coexist within one and the same population, it may be necessary to place restrictions 
on this freedom in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone's 
beliefs are respected.’ The problem arose from whether it was necessary to restrict the right to wear a 
headscarf at the university to protect the rights of others.  
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The strict separation of the state and religion is a fundamental value of the Turkish system.  The 
ECHR puts Turkey in a special place by the ban of Islamic headscarves in public stating that the 
restrictions are necessary in a democratic society.  The margin of appreciation was recognised by the 
court in respect of the political principles that determine the relationships between state and religion. 
Article 9 is aimed at providing an adequate guarantee of the right to freedom of religion and belief.  In 
this case, the court applied the convention regarding the secularism-oriented tolerance wherein the 
state decides to be positively secular and draws a line of separation between state and religion. This 
choice is normally justified by historical reasons, to preserve the autonomy of the state or by claiming 
it is indispensable to keep the state free from the religious intolerance of a significant section of a 
population. 
In Connolly v. DPP11 Veronica Connolly sent graphic images of aborted foetuses to pharmacies.  She 
was a Roman Catholic who objected to the morning after pill.  She was prosecuted under the 
Malicious Communications Act 1988. She held that the prosecution violated her right to freedom of 
expression under Article 10 of the Convention.  Her appeal against prosecution was dismissed.  
Under the Human Rights Act 1998, the restriction on her freedom of expression was justified because 
the images were grossly indecent and offensive. The restriction was for the protection of the rights of 
others, in accordance with the exception of Article 9.   
Again, dependant on the nature and severity of the act or thing committed, the Section could restrict 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.  The restriction could be in pursuance of one 
of the legitimate aims.   When considering if it is proportionate, it would again depend on the facts of 
the individual case.  The Section speaks only of contempt of god or religion. It could be interpreted 
(and most likely) would have been at the time to be a Christian religion with a Christian god.  With this 
interpretation, the Section would easily be interpreted as being incompatible with Article 9. However, 
in the absence of definitions, it could be all inclusive and thus compatible with the article. 
 
Article 10 of the Convention provides: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.  This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the 
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.  
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity 
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
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for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary.  
In Castells v Spain12 The applicant was a senator of an opposition political party.  He published an 
article in a magazine criticising the government.  He was convicted of insulting the government and 
disqualified from holding public office.  During the trial he attempted to adduce evidence as to the 
truth of the article but it was declared inadmissible by the court.  He claimed that his conviction 
constituted an unjustified interference with his right to freedom of expression.  It was held that the 
contents of the published article had to be considered as a whole.  Many of the assertions were 
susceptible to an attempt to establish their truth.  Declaring evidence inadmissible on the ground that 
the defence of truth could not be pleaded in respect of insults directed at the institutions of the nation, 
effectively denied the applicant a defence.  Such interference in the exercise of his freedom of 
expression was not necessary in a democratic society and violated Article 10. 
Prager and another v Austria13 The applicants were journalists and the second applicant was also the 
proprietor of a magazine in which they published an article found to be defamatory of a judge, 
contrary to Article 111 Austrian Criminal Code.  The truth or a justified belief in the truth of the 
statement, were defences.  Under section 6 of the Media Act, the publisher was strictly liable in the 
case of defamation and could be jointly and severally liable for fines and costs.  There was power to 
order the seizure of offending material.  They complained that their conviction violated their right to 
freedom of expression.  Their application was held admissible.  By five votes to four the application 
was dismissed.  The state had the first duty to protect confidence in the judiciary against destructive 
attack, which was necessary if the judicial function was to be carried out in a law governed state.  As 
the nature of the attack upon the judge had been severe and as the first applicant was unable to 
demonstrate the truth of his allegations or that his research was sufficient to demonstrate good faith 
and as he had not given the judge an opportunity to comment upon the accusations, the admitted 
interference was not disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.  Article 10 had not been violated. 
The Section again restricts the right in the article, however this restriction is in pursuance of some of 
the legitimate aims, namely the interests of national security and territorial integrity by protecting 
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or the rights of others and for maintaining the authority and impartiality of 
the judiciary.  Again, depending on the nature and severity of the ‘act or thing’ done by an individual if 
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it is no more than the minimum necessary restriction needed in order to achieve the legitimate aims 
then it is not incompatible with the Convention.   
 
It is also worth remembering that the Section was drafted over 70 years before the Convention was 
even considered as a thought and some 60 years before the Act was introduced into Manx Law.  The 
drafters would have been ignorant to the concept and theory of Human Rights.   
 
In reality, it is rare that an offence would be brought under this section but if so it may require the 
court to make a declaration of incompatibility if the Section is deemed incompatible or contravenes 
the convention rights by notifying the Attorney General.  This will then pressurise Tynwald to 
implement changes.  The penalties for a conviction under this Section could also be relatively minor 
or overly harsh depending on the ‘act or thing’ done.  Serious offences would generally be covered by 
other legislation where the punishment is proportionate to the crime committed, for example acts of 
terrorism.   
 
In conclusion, while the Section is for the most part prima facie incompatible with the Convention, to 
accurately determine if the Section is compatible with the Convention rights referred to in the Act the 
facts of each individual case have to be considered, as demonstrated by the addressed case law in 
this essay.  It is also dependant on the article and right in question.  The legitimate aims which are 
allowed under the above Rights can arguably be interpreted as being equally as broad and vague as 
the Section itself.  Determining proportionality depends on nature and severity of the act or thing done 
and again, the facts of each individual case. 
 
 
